The myth-busts, hot takes, explainers, and tools worth keeping.
◆Hot Take· 1
◆Hot Take54:00
Peach and Lily Hired No Beauty Veteran Until Year Seven
Yoon says the company did not hire anyone from a beauty company until roughly its seventh year, an outcome she describes as unintentional. The missing industry playbook led the team to present 30 finished products to Ulta, ask labs for unusual terms, and reject conventional choices that did not fit the business; she believes that outsider behavior often helped, while noting that the company now has specialized industry veterans.
The early team did not inherit standard beauty-company processes
Yoon brought 30 finished product options to an early Ulta pitch
She asked laboratories to support open-ended innovation timelines
Not knowing customary expectations made it easier to question them
The later organization added specialized teams without abandoning every original process
“I hadn't hired anyone from a beauty company until year seven of the business.”
How Eczema Turned Skincare Into Alicia Yoon's Lifelong Mission
Yoon describes severe eczema as a source of pain, uncertainty, and emotional strain while growing up. She says that experience still shapes how Peach and Lily listens to customers and teaches skincare, while presenting her account as personal experience rather than medical guidance.
Unpredictable flare-ups made Yoon feel that her health was outside her control
Her mother's efforts to find relief became an important early memory
She says empathy for people with skin struggles remains a daily business driver
Her interest broadened from her own eczema to skincare education
“I have like a special place in my heart for anyone who has like any skin struggles.”
“Whenever I meet consumers face to face and they talk to me about their skin issues, it's like I just have that special place in…”
#founder story#eczema#customer empathy#mission
❝Story10:30
The $30,000 Fashion Startup Yoon Chose Not to Scale
Before Peach and Lily, Yoon spent about $30,000 testing a Korean fast-fashion showroom while at business school. She says the project roughly broke even, but unreliable garment labels and insufficient sizing diversity made scalable US importing impractical, so she stopped without treating the experiment as a personal failure.
Yoon tested demand with inventory, a website, photos, and physical showrooms
A very cheap payment processor withheld funds and became unexpectedly expensive
Missing or unreliable fabric labels created tariff and compliance problems
Broader sizing required redesign rather than simply enlarging existing cuts
She stopped because the operating model did not scale and the mission was not deeply personal
“Sometimes you get what you pay for and if they're like so much cheaper than everyone else in the market, maybe there's a reason.”
“I was starting to realize like this isn't really going to scale.”
#fashion#startup failure#compliance#scaling
❝Story20:00
It Took Six Months to Secure Peach and Lily's First Brand
Yoon expected to spend one month in Korea signing brands for a new US K-beauty platform, but established companies rejected a founder with no customers or website. She set a six-month deadline, kept meeting suppliers, and finally won over Be the Skin; its reputation then helped unlock conversations with other brands.
Yoon refused to weaken curation just to launch faster
Her initial one-month supplier estimate expanded to six months
She set a clear deadline for returning to BCG if no suitable brand agreed
Ingredient knowledge and persistence helped secure the first partner
One respected supplier reduced perceived risk for later partners
“If in 6 months I can't secure a single brand that I actually want to bring to the US I will go back to BCG.”
“You are the most persistent person.”
#supplier sales#persistence#k-beauty#credibility
❝Story22:00
The $7 Bank Balance and 40-Block Delivery Walk
About a year after launching the store, Yoon says she had $7 left, paused debt, canceled credit cards, and nearly lost her home. She chose to walk 40 blocks while hand-delivering New York orders so she could still buy a $2 slice of pizza, illustrating how severe the early cash constraint became.
The first six months required roughly $40,000 in business spending, excluding living costs
Yoon stopped paying herself and lived extremely frugally
Development iterations and basic operating work consumed cash faster than expected
She canceled credit cards because she did not want to keep adding debt
The business showed demand before its cash flow caught up
“At one point I had $7 to my name plus debt that I just like put on pause.”
“I will walk 40 blocks and I am going to drop off all of the New York packages.”
The Snail Mucin Product Yoon Was Afraid to Promote
Yoon says she initially felt squeamish about snail mucin, then believed a product helped clear a personal breakout within two days. Worried the ingredient would make the wider store seem strange, she quietly added the product without normal launch promotion; she says customers still found it and made it a top-two SKU within five days. Her skin result is a personal claim, not established here as medical evidence.
Yoon's own initial reaction mirrored the customer objection she feared
She says her personal experience motivated her to investigate the ingredient further
The product received no normal email or campaign launch
Unexpected organic sales changed the company's willingness to market it
The store's broad assortment provided product-level demand data
“It was a silent launch. Like I just like put up the PDP.”
“Somehow people found it and it became like this really like top two skew like within 5 days.”
The Nervous Presale That Turned Glass Skin Into a Category
After years of research and development, Peach and Lily launched its Glass Skin Refining Serum alone on presale with simple texture images and product copy. Yoon says the presale sold out before stock was ready, later launches kept selling out, and customer questions prompted a free educational ebook. She frames glass skin as her skincare philosophy of a nourished, hydrated appearance, not a medical diagnosis or guaranteed result.
The formula existed before the glass skin name
Yoon worried customers might interpret the name literally or negatively
The initial presale promised delivery about a month and a half later
Demand forced emergency production discussions with the lab
A free ebook answered recurring questions about what the term meant
“The serum formula came first before the name.”
“we sold out in the pre-sale and I was like oh oh my”
Why Yoon and Her Husband Personally Trained 100 Ulta Stores
Peach and Lily entered a 250-store trial without access to Ulta's national training programs and could not afford a field team. Yoon and her husband visited 100 stores across the country in two months, spending about four hours in each; she says the trip taught them store culture and generated valuable direct customer feedback.
The limited trial footprint blocked access to scalable national training
The company believed untrained store staff would struggle to explain the products
Yoon and her husband substituted founder labor for a field-team budget
Each visit included training and community contact
The tour produced operational and customer insight beyond its immediate sales purpose
“We literally went personally to a hundred stores over 56 30 the course of two months across the entire country”
“We really got to understand the retail store culture.”
#ulta#retail training#founder led sales#customer feedback
▲Takeaway· 2
▲Takeaway1:04:00
Yoon Calls Peach and Lily a $100 Million Business
Asked about scale after 13 years, Yoon describes Peach and Lily as a roughly $100 million business and says it is growing rapidly. She attributes its resilience during industry downturns to uncompromising product work and disciplined, data-led marketing, but the episode does not independently verify the financial figure or define the valuation or revenue basis.
The $100 million description is Yoon's own high-level claim
She does not provide a detailed financial breakdown in the episode
She credits sustained product iteration as one growth factor
She credits sticking with marketing levers supported by company data as another
She warns that outsiders cannot infer profitability from how large a company appears
“it's now been 13 years which I can't even believe Um you know call it a hund00 million business”
“We're going to look at our data and we're going to see the marketing levers that make sense for us.”
Why Yoon Still Reads Customer Service Emails and DMs
Yoon argues that nuanced consumer insight is a competitive edge that should not disappear as the company grows. She says she still reads Zendesk emails and direct messages, linking that habit to the kind of feedback gathered during the 100-store tour and to better product decisions.
Direct selling reveals customer objections that reports may miss
Nuanced language can expose specific product needs
Yoon continues reading customer-service emails after reaching significant scale
She considers proximity more important, not less important, as the business grows
“It's so important to stay incredibly close to your consumer.”
“Even today, you know, I will read go into Zenesk and read like consumer emails.”